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Abstract—We consider the problem of how to determine a
fair source coding rate allocation method for the lossless data
compression problem in multiterminal networks, e.g, the wireless
sensor network where there are a large number of sources
to be encoded. We model this problem by a game-theoretic
approach and present a decomposition method for obtaining the
Shapley value, a fair source coding rate vector in the Slepian-
Wolf achievable region. We formulate a coalitional game model
where the entropy function quantifies the cost incurred due
to the source coding rates in each coalition. In the typical
case for which the game is decomposable, we show that the
Shapley value can be obtained separately for each subgame.
The complexity of this decomposition method is determined by
the maximum size of subgames, which is strictly smaller than
the total number of sources and contributes to a considerable
reduction in computational complexity. Experiments demonstrate
large complexity reduction when the number of sources becomes
large.
Index Terms—Coalitional game, data compression, decompos-
able game, polymatroid, Shapley value, submodularity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communications, we usually discuss how to
transmit the messages in the most efficient way and many
studies deal with the problem of collecting and forwarding
information from a random source to the sink or destination
with the minimum cost, e.g., [1], [2]. For multiple random
sources, which are correlated in general, using the minimal
code length to describe the sources with the least information
loss is referred to as the data compression, or source coding,
problem [3]. While the authors in [4], [5] derived the Slepian-
Wolf (SW) constraints (lower bounds) that describe the achiev-
able source coding rate region, they also stated that the lossless
data compression can be attained without interactive commu-
nications between the sources, i.e., the individual sources can
be encoded in a lossless manner without the knowledge of
others. This allows the information theoretic results on source
coding problems to be applied to multiterminal networks, e.g.,
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.
The typical examples of the multiterminal source coding
problem are the coded cooperative data exchange (CCDE)
problem [2], [6], where the sources are mobile clients, and
the distributed source coding problem over a wireless sensor
network (WSN) [1], [7]. Take a WSN for example. We usually
have a cluster, or group, of sensor nodes scattered in one area
and one of them is served as the cluster header to collect the
cluster header
sensor node
sink node
Fig. 1. Wireless sensor network: A group of sensor nodes measure some
features in a region. Sensors form clusters with one in each cluster serving as
the cluster header to forward the measurements to a sink node. The cluster
headers may or may not be connected.
measurements and forward to a sink node or base station. See
Fig. 1. Such a WSN poses a two-layer multiterminal source
coding problem: sensors-to-cluster header and cluster headers-
to-base station, which is usually solved in a distributed manner,
e.g., [8].
Multiterminal data compression usually refers to the case of
more than two data sources. In some cases, such as for a WSN,
there are a large number of sources to be encoded. Importantly,
it was pointed out in [9], [10] that all source coding rates for
the lossless multiterminal data compression constitute the core
of a coalitional game and the core can be very large. For the
problem of how to select a solution in the core, the fairness
is usually considered in multiterminal networks such that the
users are equally privileged, e.g., CCDE and WSN.1 While the
fair source coding schemes for the two terminals case were
proposed in [12], [13] for a WSN, the question remains as to
how to allocate the source coding rates fairly when the number
of terminals becomes large. The authors in [10] proposed a
fairness solution by the Shapley value. But, the exponentially
growing complexity of obtaining such a value imposes huge
computation burden in large scale systems.
This paper addresses the problem of fairness in the multi-
terminal data compression problem from a coalitional game-
theoretic point of view. We propose a decomposition method
for obtaining the Shapley value [14], a fair source coding rate
vector in the core. We first convert the SW lower bounds
1A fair source coding scheme also evens out the battery power consumption
of sensors, which prolongs the lifetime of a WSN: The lifetime is usually
defined as the time to which the first sensor node runs out of battery power
[11].
to upper bounds, based on which a coalitional game model
is formulated with the entropy function quantifying the cost
incurred due to the source coding rates in each coalition. The
submodularity of the entropy function ensures the convexity
of the game and also ensures that the core, or the achievable
rate vector set for the lossless data compression, is nonempty.
We then explain the incentive for the users to cooperate: The
users pay the least cost only if they cooperatively encode
the multiple sources. We show that, in the common case that
the game can be decomposed into a group of subgames, the
Shapley value can be obtained separately for each subgame.
While the finest decomposer of a decomposable game can
be determined by an existing algorithm in [15] in quadratic
time, the complexity of obtaining the Shapley value by the
decomposition method is determined by the maximal subgame
size, which is strictly less than the total number of sources in
the entire system and contributes to a considerable reduction
in computational complexity. Experiments demonstrate large
reduction when the number of sources becomes large.
A. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model for the multiterminal source
coding problem. A coalition game model characterized by
the entropy function of the random sources is proposed in
Section II, where we show the convexity of the game and
explain the users’ incentive to cooperate in the game. In
Section IV, we propose the decomposition method to obtain
the Shapley value and discuss the method’s complexity. In
Section V, we provide some concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let V with |V | > 1 be a finite set that contains the indices
of all users in the system. We call V the ground set. Let
ZV = (Zi : i ∈ V ) be a vector of discrete random variables
indexed by V . User i privately observes an n-sequence Zni
of the random source Zi that is i.i.d. generated according to
the joint distribution PZV . The users are required to send their
observations to a sink node T in a way so that the source
sequence ZnV can be reconstructed by T . This problem is called
multiterminal data compression or source coding with side
information [3].
Let rV = (ri : i ∈ V ) be a rate vector that is indexed
by V . Each dimension ri in rV denotes the source coding
rate of Zi, i.e., the expected coding length at which user i
encodes his/her observation Zni of source Zi. We call rV an
achievable rate vector if the sink T is able to recover the
source sequence ZnV by letting the users transmit at the rates
that are designated by rV . The achievable rate region for the
lossless data compression is characterized by the Slepian-Wolf
(SW) constraints as follows.
A. Achievable Rate Region: Slepian-Wolf Constraints
For X,Y ⊆ V , let H(ZX) be the amount of randomness
in ZX measured by Shannon entropy [3]
2 and H(ZX |ZY ) =
2In this paper, we take all logarithms to base 2 so that all entropies are
measured in bits. However, the results in this paper apply to all bases.
1
Z1 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wd,We)
2
Z2 = (Wa,Wb,Wf )
3
Z3 = (Wc,Wd,Wf )
T
Fig. 2. The multiterminal data compression problem with V = {1, 2, 3} in
Example 1: User i observes Zi in private. The users are required to encode
their sources Zis so that the sink node T is able to recover ZV .
H(ZX∪Y ) −H(ZY ) be the conditional entropy of ZX given
ZY . In the rest of this paper, without loss of generality, we
simplify the notation ZX by X . For a rate vector rV , let r be
the sum-rate function associated with rV such that
r(X) =
∑
i∈X
ri, ∀X ⊆ V
with the convention r(∅) = 0. r(X) is the sum of source
coding rates over all the users in X and r(V ) is the overall
source coding rate in the system.
It is shown in [4], [5] that the sources can be encoded
separately at rates rV so that the sink node T is able to decode
them with arbitrarily small error probability if and only if3
r(X) ≥ H(X |V \X), ∀X ( V,
r(V ) = H(V ).
(1)
The interpretation of (1) is: For the data compression to be
lossless, (a) the users in X must reveal H(X |V \ X), the
information that is uniquely obtained by X , to the sink; (b)
the users must reveal the total information H(V ) to the sink.
The inequalities in (1) are called the SW constraints, which
describe the achievable rate region
R(V ) = {rV ∈ R
|V | :
r(X) ≥ H(X |V \X), ∀X ( V, r(V ) = H(V )}.
In Section III-A, we show that R(V ) 6= ∅ due to the sub-
modularity of the entropy function [16]. In Section III-C, this
nonemptiness of R(V ) will be interpreted from a coalitional
game-theoretic point of view.
Example 1. Assume there are three users V = {1, 2, 3} in
the system. They observe respectively
Z1 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wd,We),
Z2 = (Wa,Wb,Wf ),
Z3 = (Wc,Wd,Wf ),
3In this paper, we consider the perfect case of data compression r(V ) =
H(V ) when there is no information redundancy, which allows us to derive
the decomposition property in Section IV-B. However, one can allow r(V ) ≥
H(V ), or r(C) ≥ H(C) for each subgame if the game is decomposable (see
Section IV-B), in the implementation.
where Wb is an independent random bit with H(Wb) =
3
10 ,
Wf is an independent random bit with H(Wf ) =
1
2 and all
other Wj are independent uniformly distributed random bit,
i.e., H(Wj) = 1 for all j ∈ {a, c, d, e}. The users are required
to encode Zis so that ZV can be reconstructed at T . See Fig. 2.
In this system, the achievable rate region is characterized
by the SW constraints:
R(V ) =
{
rV ∈ R
|V | : r(∅) = 0,
r({1}) ≥ H({1}|{2, 3}) = 1,
r({2}) ≥ H({2}|{1, 3}) = 0,
r({3}) ≥ H({3}|{1, 2}) = 0,
r({1, 2}) ≥ H({1, 2}|{3}) =
23
10
,
r({1, 3}) ≥ H({1, 3}|{2}) = 3,
r({2, 3}) ≥ H({2, 3}|{1}) =
1
2
}
r({1, 2, 3}) =
24
5
.
We have R(V ) 6= ∅. For example, rV = (1,
9
5 , 2) is an
achievable rate vector in R(V ).
III. COALITIONAL GAME
The relationship between the data compression problem and
the coalitional game formulation was previously revealed in
[9], [10] based on the SW constraints (1). It is shown that
the achievable rate region R(V ) coincides with the core of a
convex game which is necessarily nonempty. In this section,
we express the achievable rate region R(V ) by converting
the lower bounds in (1) to the upper bounds in terms of the
entropy function, based on which, we propose a coalitional
game model. We show the equivalence of the core and the
submodular base polyhedron of the entropy function, which
allows us to derive the decomposition property of the core in
Section IV and address a vital aspect missing from [9], [10]:
The reason for the users to be cooperative in the multiterminal
data compression problem in V .
A. Base Polyhedron
For X ⊆ V , consider the lower bound r(X) ≥ H(X |V \
X) in the SW constraints (1). Since we also restrict the total
rate r(V ) = H(V ), we necessarily impose an upper bound
constraint on the sum-rate in V \X
r(V \X) = r(V )−r(X) ≤ H(V )−H(X |V \X) = H(V \X).
By converting the lower bounds in (1) for all X ⊆ V , we have
the SW constrained region fully characterized by the entropy
function H : 2V 7→ R:
r(X) ≤ H(X), ∀X ( V,
r(V ) = H(V ).
(2)
It is shown in [16] that the entropy function H is a
polymatroid rank function: (a) normalized: H(∅) = 0; (b)
monotonic: H(X) ≥ H(Y ) for all X,Y ⊆ V such that
Y ⊆ X ; (c) submodular:
H(X) +H(Y ) ≥ H(X ∩ Y ) +H(X ∪ Y ), X, Y ⊆ V.
The polyhedron and base polyhedron of H are respectively
[17, Section 2.3] [18, Definition 9.7.1]
P (H,≤) = {rV ∈ R
|V | : r(X) ≤ H(X), ∀X ⊆ V },
B(H,≤) = {rV ∈ P (f,≤) : r(V ) = H(V )}.
We have the achievable rate region coincides with the base
polyhedron of the entropy function H :
R(V ) = B(H,≤).
B. Coalitional Game Model
Let the users in V be the players in a game. Instead of
being totally selfish, the players may cooperate with each other
to form coalitions, e.g., instead of encoding the source Zi by
him/herself, user i may form the group X with the other users
in X \ {i} so as to encode ZX cooperatively. In this game,
a subset X ⊆ V is called a coalition and V is the grand
coalition. Let H be the characteristic cost function such that,
for each coalition X ⊆ V , H(X) quantifies the outcome of
coalition X : If all the players i ∈ X cooperate in X , i.e., if
coalition X forms, the total cost incurred due to the source
coding rates among the users in X is H(X). The coalitional
game model for the multiterminal data compression problem is
characterized by the ground set V that indexes all the players
and the entropy function H . We denote the coalition game
model by Ω(V,H).
In Ω(V,H), rV is a cost allocation method that describes
how the total cost r(V ) is distributed to the individual users.
Here, the source coding rate ri is interpreted as the cost that
user i pays in participating the data compression problem in
V . The solution of the game Ω(V,H) is the core [19], [20]
C (V ) = {rV ∈ R
|V | : r(X) ≤ H(X), ∀X ⊆ V,
r(V ) = H(V )}, (3)
which contains all cost allocation methods rV that distribute
exactly cost H(V ) among the users in V . The inequality
r(X) ≤ H(X) states that the total the cost in any coalition
X ( V is no greater than H(X), which ensures that no users
have incentive to break from the grand coalition and form a
smaller one [19]. In this sense, the core contains all cost/rate
allocation methods such that all users would like to take part in
the data compression problem in V .4 Based on the definition of
the core (3), it is easy to see the equivalence of the achievable
rate region, the base polyhedron of H and the core:
R(V ) = B(H,≤) = C (V ). (4)
This equivalence also gives rise to the main result in this
paper: The decomposition of B(H,≤) is equivalent to the
4It is also show in [21, Theorem 8] that the core is a stable set of cost
allocation methods such that no coalitions X ( V have incentive to break
from the grand coalition.
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Fig. 3. The polyhedron P (H,≤) and base polyhedron B(H,≤) of the
entropy function H in the system in Example 1. Here, B(H,≤) coincides
with the achievable rate region R(V ) for the lossless multiterminal data
compression problem and the core C (V ) of the coalitional game Ω(V,H).
decomposition of the game Ω(V,H), which results in the
decomposition of the Shapley value (See Section IV-B).
Example 2. Consider the system in Example 1. Fig. 3 shows
P (H,≤) and B(H,≤), the polyhedron and base polyhedron
of the entropy function H , respectively. The base polyhedron
B(H,≤) coincides with the achievable rate region R(V ) and
the core C (V ) of the game Ω(V,H), which is a region on the
plane {rV ∈ R
|V | : r(V ) = 245 } that is bounded by a set of
linear constraints.
In general, the core C (V ) of a coalition game could be
empty, i.e., there exists at least one user that is unwilling
to cooperate in the grand coalition; If C (V ) 6= ∅, it is
not necessarily a singleton set. Then, the two fundamental
questions in the coalitional game are:
(a) Is the core nonempty, or do all the users in V have
incentive to cooperate in the grand coalition V ?
(b) If the core is nonempty, can we find a fair cost/rate
allocation method in the core C (V )?
In the next subsection, we show that question (a) has a
straightforward answer due to the convexity of the game
Ω(V,H). The Shapley value in Section IV answers question
(b).
C. Convexity and Nonemptiness of Core
According to the definition in [21, Section 2], a coalitional
game is convex if and only if the characteristic cost function is
submodular.5 Due to the fact that the entropy function H is a
polymatroid rank function, a subgroup of submodular function,
it is straightforward that the game Ω(V,H) is convex. The
convexity of the game Ω(V,H) is consistent with the results
in [9], [10].6 According to [21, Theorem 4], the core of a
5The definition in [21, Section 2] is based on the supermodularity of the
characteristic payoff function, which corresponds to the submodularity of the
characteristic cost function.
6The authors in [9], [10] formulated a coalitional game model Ω(V,H#)
with the the dual set function H# being the characteristic payoff function,
where the nonemptiness of the core C (V ) is due to the supermodularity of
H#. See Appendix A for the details.
convex game is nonempty. Therefore, for the multiterminal
data compression problem, we have Ω(V,H) being convex
with a nonempty core C (V ), i.e., all the users would like to
cooperate with each other and, therefore, the grand coalition
V forms necessarily.7
Example 3. For the system in Example 1, assume that the
users are working individually at the beginning so that user
i encodes the source Zi at the rate that is exactly equal to
H({i}), i.e., ri = H({i}) for all i ∈ V . However, it will
not take long for user i to realize that he/she can reduce the
source coding rate by cooperating with another user. Take user
3 for example: If user 3 works alone, the source coding rate is
r3 = H({3}) =
5
2 ; If user 3 cooperates with user 2, we have
r2 + r3 = r({2, 3}) = H({2, 3}) =
19
5 , which means user 3
can encode Z3 with a rate strictly lower than
5
2 and so as user
2, e.g., the rate (r2, r3) = (
3
2 ,
23
10 ) is sufficient to encode Z{2,3}.
Note, the cooperative behavior of users 2 and 3 in coalition
{2, 3} is essentially due to the positive mutual information
I({2} ∧ {3}) = H({2}) +H({3})−H({2, 3}) = 52 > 0.
After coalition {2, 3} forms, users 2 and 3 will soon
realize that, if they cooperate with user 1, all the users can
further reduce the source coding rates and therefore the grand
coalition V forms. In fact, by assuming that the users form
any coalition X ( V , it can be shown that they would finally
merge with others to form the grand coalition V .
Example 3 reveals the reason for the nonemptiness of the
core in the data compression problem: the nonnegativity of the
mutual information. The mutual information can be considered
as the information redundancy in the source coding, or data
compression, problem, which can be minimized if the users
cooperatively encode the multiple sources in ZV . The worst
case is when the mutual information is zero, i.e., when all
the sources in ZV are mutually independent, where working
separately or cooperating in V are indifferent for the users.
See the example below.
Example 4. Assume the three users in V = {1, 2, 3} observe
respectively
Z1 = (Wa),
Z2 = (Wb),
Z3 = (Wc),
where Wj for all j ∈ {a, b, c} is an independent uniformly
distributed random bit, i.e., the components in ZV are mu-
tually independent. Fig. 4 shows the core C (V ) reduces
to a point rV = (1, 1, 1). It can be shown that forming
any coalition X ⊆ V , including the singleton and grand
coalition, necessarily results in ri = 1 for all i ∈ V , i.e.,
it makes no difference whether the users work separately or
cooperate. Alternatively, encoding Zis separately is equivalent
to encoding ZV cooperatively.
7On the other hand, the base polyhedron of a submodular function is
nonempty [17, Theorem 2.3]. So, due to the equivalence (4), C (V ) 6= ∅.
Or, the nonemptiness of C (V ) is essentially due to the submodularity of H .
0
0.5
1
1.5
0
1
0
1
r1
r2
r
3
R(V ) = B(H,≤) = C (V )
P (H,≤)
Fig. 4. The polyhedron P (H,≤) and base polyhedron B(H,≤) of the
entropy function H of a mutually independent multiple sources in Example 4.
In this case, C (V ) = {(1, 1, 1)} and it makes no difference for the users to
work separately or cooperate with each other.
IV. SHAPLEY VALUE
Since the core is not a singleton in general, the question
follows is how to select a cost allocation method, or source
coding rate vector, rV in the core C (V ) of the game Ω(V,H).
In a coalitional game where the users are considered as peers,
e.g., the sensor nodes in a WSN, a natural selection criterion is
the fairness, i.e., we want to find a rV ∈ C (V ) that distributes
the total cost H(V ) as fairly as possible among the users in V .
There is a well-known answer to this problem: The Shapley
value rˆV [14], a unique value that lies in the core of the convex
game Ω(V,H), with each dimension being
rˆi =
∑
C⊆V \{i}
|C|!(|V | − |C| − 1)!
|V |!
(H(C ⊔ {i})−H(C)),
(5)
where ⊔ is the disjoint union. The Shapley value has been
adopted in [7] as a fair source coding scheme. rˆ is fair in that
it assigns each player his/her expected marginal cost, which
can be explained by its relationship with the extreme points
in the core as follows.
A. Extreme Points
Let ΦV = (φ1, . . . , φ|V |) be a permutation of the user in-
dices, e.g., Φ = (2, 3, 1, 4) is a permutation of V = {1, . . . , 4}.
Consider the Edmond greedy algorithm [22]: For i = 1 to |V |,
do
rφi = H({φi}|{φ1, . . . , φi−1})
with rφ1 = H({φ1}). The resulting rV is an extreme point
in the core C (V ) [22]. In fact, the Edmond greedy algorithm
states that an achievable rate vector in the core C (V ) can
be reached if the users in V encode the source with the side
information at the sink in order. This approach has also been
adopted in [8] for the distributed source coding problem. See
also Example 5 below. Let EX(V ) denote the set of all the
extreme points in the core C (V ). EX(V ) can be constructed
by applying the Edmond greedy algorithm for all permutations
of V .
0
2
4
0
1
2
0
1
2
r1
r2
r
3
R(V ) = B(H,≤) = C (V )
P (H,≤)
EX(V )
path to (1, 95, 2)
Fig. 5. The updated path of the source coding rate vector: (0, 0, 0) →
(0, 9
5
, 0) → (0, 9
5
, 2) → (1, 9
5
, 2) resulting from the Edmond greedy
algorithm [22] for the permutation Φ = (2, 3, 1) in the system in Example 1.
The corresponding explanation is in Example 5.
Example 5. We apply the Edmond greedy algorithm to the
system in Example 1 for the permutation Φ = (2, 3, 1).
For φ1 = 2, we assign the source coding rate r2 =
H({2}) = 95 so that the sink node T obtain the source
sequence Zn2 ; For φ2 = 3, we assign the source coding
rate to user 3 conditioned on the information obtained by
T , i.e., r3 = H({3}|{T }) = H({3}|{2}) = 2 so that
H({T }) = H({2, 3}) and Zn{2,3} is recovered at T ; For
φ3 = 1, user 3 just need to send the remaining information,
i.e., r1 = H({1}|{T }) = H({1}|{2, 3}) = 1 so that Zn{1,2,3}
is recovered at T . The resulting rate vector rV = (1,
9
5 , 2) is
an extreme point in the core C (V ). See Fig. 5. We have the
extreme point set
EX(V ) =
{
(
43
10
,
1
2
, 0), (
43
10
, 0,
1
2
), (3,
9
5
, 0),
(1,
9
5
, 2), (
23
10
, 0,
5
2
), (1,
13
10
,
5
2
)
}
,
(6)
where all rV ∈ EX(V ) can be determined by applying the
Edmond greedy algorithm for all |V |! = 6 permutations of V .
The Shapley value assigns each user i the expected source
coding rate rˆi resulting from the Edmond greedy algorithm
by assuming that each order, or permutation, Φ to form the
grand coalition is equiprobable. For a subset C ( V such that
i /∈ C, assume that the user i joins the coalition C ⊔ {i} after
the coalition C is formed and, then, the rest of the users in
V \ (C ⊔ {i}) join and form the grand coalition V . In the
Edmond greedy algorithm, user i will be assigned the rate
H(C ⊔ {i})−H(C) for the |C|!(|V | − |C| − 1)! out of |V |!
time, which explains the weight in (5). In other words, the
Shapley value rˆV is the average value over all the extreme
points in the core C (V ):
rˆV =
∑
rV EX(V )
rV
|EX(V )|
This is the reason that rˆV is called the gravity center of the
extreme points of the core in a convex game in [14].
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Shapley value rˆV
Fig. 6. The Shapley value rˆV = (
53
20
, 9
10
, 5
4
) for the system in Example 1.
rˆV is a fair rate allocation method in the core C (V ). In fact, rˆV is the gravity
center of all the extreme points in EX(V ).
Example 6. For the system in Example 1, we have the Shapley
value in core C (V ) being rˆV = (
53
20 ,
9
10 ,
5
4 ) in Fig. 6, which
is exactly the value of
∑
rV EX(V )
rV
|EX(V )| , where the extreme point
set EX(V ) is enumerated in (6).
B. Decomposition
Although the Shapley value is the desired fair cost allocation
method in the core C (V ), calculating it might be cumbersome
in large scale systems. Assume that the value of H(X) for
any X ⊆ V can be obtained by an oracle call and δ refers
to the upper bound on the computation time of this oracle
call. Obtaining the Shapley value in (5) requires the value of
H(X) for all X ⊆ V so that the complexity is O(2|V | · δ).8
Then, there is a problem of how to alleviate this exponentially
growing complexity in large |V |. On the other hand, when the
system size |V | is large, it is very possible that the coalitional
game is decomposable: The users’ cooperating in smaller
coalitions is equivalent to cooperating in the grand coalition.
In this section, we show that the calculation of the Shapley
value in a decomposable game is separable, which results in
a reduction in computational complexity.
Definition 1 (Decomposable Convex Game [17, Theorems
3.32 and 3.38, Lemma 3.37]9). The convex game Ω(V,H)
is decomposable if
H(V ) =
∑
C∈P
H(C),
for some proper partition P of user set V . Here, P is called a
decomposer and each C ∈ P forms a subgame Ω(C,H) that
is convex. A game Ω(V,H) is indecomposable if it has only
one decomposer {V }.
8We assume that the time complexity of the multiplication and summation
operations in (5) is much less than that of the oracle call of H .
9This definition is based on the concept of the separator of a disconnected
submodular system in [15], [17], where the minimal separators are also called
the elementary separators in [15, Section 3] and the principal partition of a
polymatroid in [23].
It is easy to see that, for any decomposer P of a decom-
posable game Ω(V,H), the components in (ZC : C ∈ P)
are mutually independent. For any X,Y ⊂ V such that
X ∩ Y = ∅, let rX ⊕ rY = rX⊔Y be the direct sum of
rX and rY . For example, for r{1,3} = (r1, r3) = (3, 7)
and r{2,5,6} = (r2, r5, r6) = (5, 2, 4), r{1,3} ⊕ r{2,5,6} =
r{1,2,3,5,6} = (3, 5, 7, 2, 4). We have a decomposable core
C (V ) for a decomposable game Ω(V,H).
Lemma 1 ( [17, Theorems 3.15, 3.32 and 3.38, Corollary
3.40], [21, Theorem 6]). For a decomposer P of a decompos-
able convex game Ω(V,H), the core C (V ) is decomposable:
C (V ) = ⊕C∈PC (C)
= {⊕C∈PrC : rC ∈ C (C), C ∈ P},
where C (C) is the core of the subgame Ω(C,H); C (V ) has
dimension |V | − |P∗| where P∗ is the finest decomposer.10
We also have the decomposable Shapley value rˆV due to
the decomposition of the core C (V ) as follows. The proof of
Theorem 1 is in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. If Ω(V,H) is decomposable, we have
rˆV = ⊕C∈P rˆC
for all decomposers P , where rˆC is the Shapley value in the
core C (C) of subgame Ω(C,H).
Remark 1. Theorem 1 is a recast of [14, Corollary 2],
which is derived in terms of the characteristic payoff function
based on the concept of carriers and is proved by the the
additivity of the Shapley value in [14, Axiom 3].11 But,
Theorem 1 is derived for the decomposable game in terms
of the characteristic cost function and the proof is based on
the decomposition of the core C (V ) in Lemma 1.
According to Theorem 1, the Shapley value rˆV in a decom-
posable game Ω(V,H) can be obtained separately for each
subgame Ω(C,H) for all coalitions C in a decomposer P . In
Section IV-D, we show the advantage of this separation: the
reduction in computational complexity.
Example 7. For the system in Example 1, the game Ω(V,H) is
indecomposable since {V } is the only decomposer. Therefore,
we have |V | − |{V }| = 2 and the core C (V ) in Fig. 3 is a
2-dimensional plane. For the system in Example 4, the game
Ω(V,H) is decomposable with all partitions P of V being
the decomposer and the finest one is P∗ = {{1}, {2}, {3}}.
Therefore, the dimension of the core C (V ) in Fig. 4 is
10The decomposition of C (V ) was originally derived in [17, Theorems
3.15 and 3.38, Corollary 3.40] as the separation of the base polyhedron in a
disconnected submodular system. We express it in terms of C (V ) in Lemma 1
due to the equivalence (4). Also, for a decomposable convex game, the finest
decomposer uniquely exists. See Appendix A. For an indecomposable game
Ω(V,H), the core C (V ) has the full dimension |V | − 1 [21, Theorem 6(a)]
since P∗ = {V } is the only one decomposer.
11Based on the definition in [14, Section 2], a carrier corresponds to a
coalition C in a decomposer P . The additivity in [14, Axiom 3] is not a
property specifically for the decomposable game. Therefore, the application
of [14, Corollary 2] to decomposable games is not explicit in [14].
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Fig. 7. The core C (V ) of the decomposable game Ω(V,H) in the system
in Example 8. The finest decomposer is P∗ = {{1, 3}, {2}} so that the
dimension of C (V ) is |V |−|P∗| = 1 and the Shapley value rˆV = rˆ{1,3}⊕
rˆ2 = (
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).
|V | − |P∗| = 0: C (V ) reduces to a point (1, 1, 1) which is
necessarily the Shapley value.
Example 8. Assume that the users in V = {1, 2, 3} observe
respectively
Z1 = (Wa,Wb),
Z2 = (Wd),
Z3 = (Wb,Wc),
where Wc is an independent random bit with H(Wc) =
3
5 and
all other Wj are independent uniformly distributed random
bit. In this system, the game is decomposable with the finest
decomposer P∗ = {{1, 3}, {2}}. It is easy to see why P∗ =
{{1, 3}, {2}}: Z{1,3} and Z2 are mutually independent. The
core C (V ) in Fig. 7 has the dimension |V | − |P∗| = 1 and
reduces to a line segment. We calculate the Shapley value
separately for each subgame Ω(C,H): rˆ{1,3} = (rˆ1, rˆ3) =
(32 ,
11
10 ) for {1, 3} and rˆ2 = 1 for {2}. Then, rˆ{1,3} ⊕ rˆ2 =
(rˆ1, rˆ2, rˆ3) = (
3
2 , 1,
11
10 ) is the Shapley value of game Ω(V,H).
C. Determining Finest Decomposer
To utilize the decomposition property of a decomposer,
the first question is how to determine a decomposer. In real
applications, the decomposer would not be as obvious as in
Example 8. In fact, we would not have any prior knowledge
of the multiple random sources. In this case, whether or not
the game Ω(V,H) is decomposable and the finest decomposer
P∗, if Ω(V,H) is decomposable, can be determined by Al-
gorithm 1 that completes in O(|V |2 · δ) time, which does not
require the knowledge of ZV . Note, Algorithm 1 also returns
an extreme point in the core rV ∈ C (V ) since steps 2, 4 and
5 are in fact implementing the Edmond greedy algorithm.
Example 9. For the system in Example 8, by applying
Algorithm 1 for the permutation Φ = (3, 2, 1), we have
rV = (1, 1,
8
5 ), which is an extreme point in the core C (V )
as shown in Fig. 7. We also have Xˆ1 = {1, 3}, Xˆ2 = {2}
and Xˆ3 = {3} at the end of each iteration. Since Xˆ1 and
Algorithm 1: Finest Decomposer [15, Algorithm 2.6]12
input : a convex coalitional game Ω(V,H)
output: P∗, the finest decomposer, if Ω(V,H) is
decomposable or P∗ = {V } if Ω(V,H) is
indecomposable and an extreme point rV ∈ C (V )
1 choose any permutation Φ;
2 rφ1 ← H({φ1}) and Xˆφ1 ← {φ1};
3 for i = 2 to |V | do
4 Xˆφi ← {φ1, . . . , φi};
5 rφi ← H(Xˆφi)−H(Xˆφi \ {φi});
6 for j = 1 to i− 1 do
7 if r(Xˆφi \ {φi−j}) = H(Xˆφi \ {φi−j}) then
8 Xˆφi ← Xˆφi \ {φi−j} ;
9 endif
10 endfor
11 endfor
12 P∗ ← {Xˆφi : i ∈ V } and keep merging any two intersecting
elements in P∗ until there is no left;
13 return P∗ and rV ;
Xˆ3 are intersecting, they are merged and result in the finest
decomposer P∗ = {{1, 3}, {2}}.
Consider the indecomposable game in Example 1. For the
permutation Φ = (2, 3, 1), Algorithm 1 returns an extreme
point rV = (1,
9
5 , 2). We also have Xˆ1 = {1, 2, 3}, Xˆ2 = {2}
and Xˆ3 = {2, 3}, all of which are merged so that P∗ =
{{1, 2, 3}}, which means the game is indecomposable.
D. Complexity
For the finest decomposer P∗ of a decomposable convex
game Ω(V,H), let Cˆ = argmax{|C| : C ∈ P∗} be the
maximum size of the subgame. The separable calculation of
the Shapley value ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC according to Theorem 1 reduces
the complexity from O(2|V | ·δ) to O( |V |
|Cˆ|
·2|Cˆ| ·δ). We remark
that O( |V |
|Cˆ|
· 2|Cˆ| · δ) is an upper bound in that (a) obtaining
the Shapley value rˆ
Cˆ
for subgame Ω(Cˆ,H) completes in
O(2|Cˆ| · δ) time and (b) there are at most |V |
|Cˆ|
such subgames.
For example, for the system in Example 8, if obtaining the
Shapley value for each element in the finest decomposer
P∗ = {{1, 3}, {2}}, we can reduce the 23 = 8 oracle calls of
H to 22 + 2 = 6.
Experiment 1. Consider the WSN in Fig. 1. We set the number
of clusters to 20. For each cluster, we fix H(V ) = 50 and vary
the number of sensors |V | from 5 to 15. For each value of |V |,
we do the followings for each cluster:
(a) randomly generate random sources ZV so that the game
Ω(V,H) is decomposable;
12Algorithm 1 is adapted from [15, Algorithm 2.6]. It has also been
independently proposed in [23] [17, Secton 3.3]. The finest decomposer has
different names: It is called the minimal separators of a polymatroid in [15,
Section 3], the principal partition of a polymatroid in [23, Section 3(b)] and
the finest partition of a disconnected submodular system in [17, Secton 3.3].
The validity of Algorithm 1 is due to the lattice structure of the minimizer
set of the problem min{H(X) − r(X) : i ∈ X ⊆ V } for all i ∈ V and
rV ∈ B(H,≤). Please see [23] for further details.
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Fig. 8. The complexity comparison between the two methods for obtaining
the Shapley value in decomposable games in Experiment 1: obtaining rˆV in
(5) and ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC for the finest decomposer P
∗ according to Theorem 1.
Note, the complexity of obtaining ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC includes the number of oracle
calls of H for determining P∗ in Algorithm 1.
(b) obtain the Shapley value rˆV in (5) and record the number
of calls of H;
(c) run Algorithm 1 to determine the finest decomposer P∗
and obtain the Shapley value rˆC for each C ∈ P∗
according to Theorem 1. Record the number of calls of
H in both Algorithm 1 and obtaining ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC .
We plot the mean number of oracle calls of H of two methods
over clusters in Fig. 8. It can be seen that the separate
calculation of the Shapley value in a decomposable convex
game Ω(V,H) contributes to a considerable reduction in
computational complexity as |V | grows.
It should be noted that overall O( |V |
|Cˆ|
· 2|Cˆ| · δ) oracle calls
can be distributed among the subgames Ω(C,H). And, the
computations of rˆC can be done in a decentralized manner.
For example, for the system in Example 8, the users in {1, 3}
and user 2 can calculate rˆ{1,3} and rˆ2, respectively, in parallel.
Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, we allow the subgames
Ω(C,H) for all C ∈ P∗ in each cluster to obtain rˆC in
parallel so that the completion time of calculating ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC
is determined by |Cˆ|, the maximum size of subgames. After
obtaining the values of H by the oracle calls in Experiment 1,
the average run time for calculating the values of rˆV and
⊕C∈P∗ rˆC over clusters is shown in Fig. 9.
13 It can be shown
that it is much faster to get ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC by allowing parallel
computation.
In addition to the decomposition property, some Shapley
value approximation methods, e.g., [24]–[26], can be applied
to each subgame Ω(C,H) to further reduce the complexity.
For example, based on the random permutation method in
[24], random samples of the permutations of C, with the size
quadratically growing in |C|, are generated so that an extreme
point subset EX′(C) ( EX(C) is obtained and
∑
rC∈EX
′(C) rC
|EX′(C)|
13We run Experiment 2 in MATLAB 2017a by a desktop computer with
Intel Core i7-6600U processer, 8Gb RAM and 64-bit Windows 10 Enterprise
operating system.
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Fig. 9. The completion time comparison between the two methods for obtain-
ing the Shapley value in decomposable games in Experiment 2: calculating rˆV
in (5) and ⊕C∈P∗ rˆC for the finest decomposer P
∗ according to Theorem 1.
Here, rˆC is calculated by each subgame Ω(C,H) in parallel. We assume
that all values of H have been obtained in Experiment 2, i.e., the completion
time does not include the oracle calls of H .
is an approximation of rˆC . Then, ⊕C∈P∗
∑
rC∈EX
′(C) rC
|EX′(C)| , the
approximation of rˆV , can be obtained in time quadratic in the
maximal subgame size |Cˆ|.
V. CONCLUSION
The coalition game model for the multiterminal data com-
pression problem was formulated in term of the characteristic
cost function, being the entropy function. The convexity of
the game and the nonemptiness of the core followed from the
submodularity of the entropy function. For a decomposable
game, the direct sum of the Shapley values in the subgames
constituted the Shapley value in the entire system. In this
case, the complexity is essentially determined by the subgame
of the maximum size and the finest decomposer determines
the least computational complexity. The study showed that
the finest minimizer can be determined in quadratic time and
the reduction in complexity by the decomposition method
for obtaining the Shapley value is large when the number of
users increases. The incentive for the users to cooperate was
also provided in this paper: The least source coding rates are
attained in the multiterminal data compression problem only
if the users cooperatively encode the multiple random sources.
One extension of the work in this paper is the design of the
source coding scheme for the Shapley value: determining the
codeword for source Zi at rate rˆi for all i ∈ V .
APPENDIX A
For the entropy function H : 2V 7→ R+, the dual set
function H# is defined as [17, Section 2.3]
H#(X) = H(V )−H(V \X) = H(X |V \X)
and is supermodular.14 The polyhedron P (H#,≥) contains
all SW constrained rate vectors with sum-rate r(V ) ≥ H(V ),
while the base polyhedron B(H#,≥) contains all SW con-
strained rate vectors with exact sum-rate r(V ) = H(V ), i.e.,
14f is supermodular if −f is submodular.
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Fig. 10. The polyhedra P (H,≤) and P (H#,≥) of the entropy function H
and its dual set function H#, respectively. The base polyhedra B(H,≤) and
B(H#,≥) coincide. The Shapley value rˆV is also called the symmetric rate
vector in [12], [13].
the SW constraints in [4], [5] are given in terms of the dual
set function H#. So is the coalition game model proposed in
[9], [10].15 Based on the equivalence B(H,≤) = B(H#,≥)
[17, Lemma 2.4], the data compression problem is studied in
terms of the entropy function H in this paper.
Example 10. For a two terminal source with the entropy
function: H(∅) = 0, H({1}) = 4, H({2}) = 6 and
H({1, 2}) = 7. We plot polyhedra P (H,≤) and P (H#,≥) in
Fig. 10, where B(H,≤) = B(H#,≥) is the SW constrained
achievable rate region R(V ).
Let Π(V ) be the set of all partitions of V . We haveH(V ) =
minP∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P H(C) [17, Theorem 2.6]. Each minimizer
is a decomposer of the game Ω(V,H) [17, Theorems 3.36,
3.38 and 3.39]16 and all minimizers form a partition lattice
[27, Definition 3.9],17 where the coarsest and finest partitions
uniquely exist. This explains the uniqueness of the finest
decomposer of a decomposable convex game in [21]. It is for
sure that {V } always belongs to this partition lattice. Based
on Definition 1, Ω(V,H) is decomposable if the partition
lattice contains partitions other than {V }; otherwise, Ω(V,H)
is indecomposable.
APPENDIX B
For a decomposer P ∈ Π′(V ), we have EX(V ) =
⊕C∈PEX(C) due to the decomposition of the core C (V ) =
15The authors in [9], [10] formulated a game model Ω(V,H#) directly
based on the SW constraints, where the dual set function H#(X) quantifies
the payoff incurred when the users cooperate in coalition X . The convexity
of the game was shown based on the supermodularity of H#.
16Decomposable convex game corresponds to the disconnected submodular
system that is defined in [17, Theorems 3.36, 3.38 and 3.39].
17It is called the Dilworth truncation lattice in [27, Definition 3.9] since
the minP∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P H(C) is called the Dilworth truncation of H .
⊕C∈PC (C) in Lemma 1. Then,
rˆV =
∑
rV ∈EX(V )
rV
|EX(V )|
=
∑
rV ∈⊕C∈PEX(C)
rV
| ⊕C∈P EX(C)|
=
⊕C∈P
(∏
C′∈P : C′ 6=C |EX(C
′)|
∑
rC∈EX(C)
rC
)
∏
C∈P |EX(C)|
= ⊕C∈P
∑
rC∈EX(C)
rC
|EX(C)|
= ⊕C∈P rˆC .
Theorem 1 holds.
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